Public Goods Provision
A firm is considering building a public good (e.g. a swimming pool). There are n agents in the economy, each with IID private value θ i ∈ [0, 1]. Agents' valuations have density f (θ) and distribution F (θ). Assume that
is increasing in θ. The cost of the swimming pool is cn, where c > 0.
First suppose the government passes a law that says the firm cannot exclude people from entering the swimming pool. A mechanism thus consists of a build decision P (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ (a) Consider an agent with type θ i , whose utility is given by
Derive her utility in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
(b) Given an build decision P (·), derive the firm's profits.
(c) What is the firm's optimal build decision?
(e) Show that as n → ∞, so the probability of provision goes to zero. [You might wish to use the Chebyshev inequality, which says that
for a random variable
Z.]
Next, suppose the firm can exclude agents. A mechanism now consists of a build decision
The cost is still given by cn, where n is the number of agents in the population.
(f) Solve for the firm's optimal build decision P (·) and participation rule x i (·).
(g) Suppose n → ∞. Show there exists a cutoff c * such that the firm provides the pool with probability one if c < c * , and with probability zero if c > c * .
Dynamic Mechanism Design
A firm sells to a customer over T = 2 periods. There is no discounting.
The consumer's per-period utility is
where q ∈ is the quantity of the good, and p is the price. The agent's type θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } is privately known. In period 1, Pr(θ = θ H ) = µ. In period 2, the agent's type may change. With probability α > 1/2, her type remains the same; with probability 1 − α her type switches (so a high type becomes a low type, or a low type becomes a high type).
The firm chooses a mechanism to maximise the sum of it's profits. The per-period profit is
given by 
Dynamic Contracts with Hidden Wage Offers
A risk neutral firm employs a risk avers worker. There are infinite periods, with discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
In period t, the firm's payoff is
where q is some fixed output, and w t is the wage. The worker obtains u(w t ).
Each period the worker obtains a wage offer w t with a strictly positive density f (·), distribution F (·) and support [0, 1]. These wage offers are IID and are not observed by the firm. Denote
The firm offers the worker a contract {w t } that consists of a series of wages. These do not depend on the outside offers. 1
Each period proceeds as follows. First, the worker sees the outside wage offer w t . Second, the worker chooses whether to quit or stay. If he quits, he never works for the firms again and obtains u(w t ) + δV . If he stays, he's paid according to the contract and the game proceeds to the next period.
(a) Suppose the agent has promised utility V . The worker quits if his outside wage offer exceeds a threshold, w * . How is w * determined?
1 One might allow the agent to make reports to the firm. We do not allow this here. (e) Suppose we are in a steady state, so V + = V and wages are constant. Show that the probability of quitting is zero, i.e., w * ≥ 1. You can either do this via a the FOC from part (d) and the envelope theorem, or from a direct argument.
